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HOW CONGRESS CAN HELP RAISE VACCINE RATES 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Y. Tony Yang* 
2019 saw an unusually high number of measles cases, and other preventable 
disease outbreaks, at least in part linked to vaccines refusal.  States are considering 
legislative responses.  This Essay examines what role the federal government can fill in 
increasing vaccines rates.  The Essay suggests that the federal government has an 
important role to fill in funding research, coordination, and local efforts.  It also 
suggests that a federal school vaccine mandate is likely not the solution: first, such 
mandates can run into plausible constitutional challenges, and second, there are policy 
arguments against it.  The policy contentions include the unfairness of imposing a 
mandate before solving access problems throughout the country, the risk of a federal 
mandate that is weaker or stronger than the state requirement, and the risk that a 
conditional mandate will lead to states losing funding needed to prevent outbreak, 
ending with the ironic result of more outbreaks as a result of such a law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Measles in the United States exceeded one thousand cases in 2019, 
making it the year with the highest number of measles cases since 1992.1  Most 
of the cases were in unvaccinated individuals, and many in unvaccinated 
children (though some were in unvaccinated or under-vaccinated adults).2  
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 *  Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, LLB, Ph.D.; Professor of Law, James Edgar Hervey Chair in 
Litigation, University of California-Hastings College of Law.  Y. Tony Yang, ScD, LLM, MPH; 
Professor and Executive Director, Center for Health Policy and Media Engagement, George 
Washington University.  We are grateful to Hadar Aviram, Erica DeWald, Chimene Keitner, 
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on previous drafts, and to Kya Coletta and Enne Mae Guerro for excellent research 
assistance.  All errors are, of course, our own. 
 1 Measles Cases and Outbreaks, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2020).  The 
final case count for 2019, as of December 31, 2019, was 1282 cases.  Id. 
 2 Manisha Patel et al., National Update on Measles Cases and Outbreaks—United States, 
January 1–October 1, 2019, 68 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 893, 893 (2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/68/wr/pdfs/mm6840e2-H.pdf.  The main 
exception was Michigan, where an outbreak was centered mostly in under-vaccinated and 
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Unsurprisingly, concerned legislators sought a response.  The state of 
Washington, facing a large measles outbreak, passed legislation to remove the 
personal belief exemption to the measles, mumps, rubella vaccine 
requirement for school (leaving in place the religious exemption)—a limited 
measure, but a significant change in a state with previously very permissive 
vaccination policies.3  Going further, Maine and New York eliminated their 
nonmedical exemptions to school immunization mandates.4  New Jersey also 
proposed a bill to eliminate its nonmedical exemption, but the law was not 
brought to a vote when proponents found themselves without enough votes 
to pass the bill.5  At the federal level, Congress held two committee hearings 
to discuss the crisis6 and proposed several bills, including bills addressing 
infrastructure, funding, and a bill to create a federal school immunization 
mandate.7 
 
unvaccinated adults who reasonably believed they were, in fact, protected.  See Lena H. Sun, 
Unaware He Had Measles, A Man Traveled from N.Y. to Michigan, Infecting 39 People, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 16, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/04/16/how-patient-zero-spread-measles-
across-state-lines-infected-people/. 
 3 Associated Press, New Law Removes Certain MMR Vaccine Exemptions for Washington 
State Schools, K5 NEWS (July 27, 2019, 10:19 AM), 
https://www.king5.com/article/news/health/new-law-removes-certain-mmr-vaccine-
exemptions-for-washington-state-schools/281-7615e2bd-c343-4745-bcbc-e5dc4739f34d.  
This law seems to echo a proposal by Dr. Douglas Opel and co-authors, published in the 
medical journal Pediatrics.  See Douglas J. Opel et al., Childhood Vaccine Exemption Policy: The 
Case for a Less Restrictive Alternative, PEDIATRICS, April 2016, at 1, 1. 
 4 See Meredith Gingold, The Path is Cleared: A Growing Body of Case Law Uphold States’ 
Removal of Non-Medical Vaccination Exemptions; Minnesota Should be Next, MINN. L. REV.: DE 
NOVO (Dec. 4, 2019), https://minnesotalawreview.org/2019/12/04/the-path-is-cleared-a-
growing-body-of-case-law-upholds-states-removal-of-non-medical-vaccination-exemptions-
minnesota-should-be-next/; Evan Simko-Bednarski, Maine Bars Residents from Opting out of 
Immunizations for Religious or Philosophical Reasons, CNN (May 27, 2019, 11:36 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/27/health/maine-immunization-exemption-repealed-
trnd/index.html. 
 5 Sharon Otterman & Tracey Tully, Strict Vaccine Law Stumbles in N.J. Legislature, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/16/nyregion/vaccines-
measles-nj-religious-exemptions.html. 
 6 See Hearing on Confronting A Growing Public Health Threat: Measles Outbreaks in the 
U.S. Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, 116th Cong. (2019), 
https://energycommerce.house.gov/committee-activity/hearings/hearing-on-
confronting-a-growing-public-health-threat-measles-outbreaks; Hearing on Vaccines Save 
Lives: What is Driving Preventable Disease Outbreaks?  Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Lab. 
& Pensions, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.help.senate.gov/hearings/vaccines-save-lives-
what-is-driving-preventable-disease-outbreaks; see also CNN Newsource, Amid Measles 
Outbreaks, Senate Hearing to Discuss How Vaccines Save Lives, ABC 10NEWS SAN DIEGO (Mar. 5, 
2019, 11:02 AM), https://www.10news.com/news/national/amid-measles-outbreaks-
senate-hearing-to-discuss-how-vaccines-save-lives. 
 7 See Vaccinate All Children Act, H.R. 2527, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Protecting 
Seniors Through Immunization Act, H.R. 5076, 116th Cong. (2019); VACCINES Act, H.R. 
2862, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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This Essay argues that Congress has an important role to fill in raising 
vaccine rates, but its most important contributions are not by direct, coercive 
action.  The most important role Congress can fill is two-fold: supporting 
states with funding to improve immunization rates in a variety of ways and 
creating the infrastructure to address vaccine hesitancy and access problems 
nationwide.  In contrast, school immunization mandates are better left to the 
states since federal mandates may face constitutional challenges and raise 
policy concerns that a more supportive effort would not. 
I.     CONGRESS CAN IMPROVE VACCINE ACCESS BY IMPROVING 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROVIDING SUPPORT 
There are several things that increase the risks of preventable disease 
outbreak in the United States.  A global increase in measles led to more 
measles coming into the United States;8 but if vaccines rates are high enough, 
herd immunity prevents incoming diseases from spreading.  The difference 
in past years was not just that more measles was coming into the United States, 
but that it was coming into communities where vaccines rates were low 
enough that large outbreaks occurred and these communities served as 
“hotspots” for disease.9  The main factor in most measles outbreaks was 
vaccine refusal.  For example, some have linked low vaccine rates to the 
Minnesota outbreak in 2017,10 the Washington State outbreak in 2019,11 and 
the measles outbreak in New York in 2019.12  Vaccine refusal was a problem 
in other outbreaks, too,13 but it is not the only issue. 
 
 8 New Measles Surveillance Data for 2019, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
https://www.who.int/immunization/newsroom/measles-data-2019/en/ (last visited Sept. 
16, 2020). 
 9 See Jacqueline K. Olive, Peter J. Hotez, Ashish Damania & Melissa S. Nolan, The State 
of the Antivaccine Movement in the United States: A Focused Examination of Nonmedical Exemptions 
in States and Counties, PLOS MED., June 12, 2018, at 1, 7, 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article/related?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.10025
78. 
 10 See, e.g., Victoria Hall et al., Measles Outbreak—Minnesota April–May 2017, 66 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 713, 716 (2017); Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & John 
Diamond, Measles and Misrepresentation in Minnesota: Can There Be Liability for Anti-Vaccine 
Misinformation That Causes Bodily Harm?, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 531, 532, 551 (2019). 
 11 See, e.g., Measles 2019: Measles in Washington State, WASH. STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, 
https://www.doh. 
wa.gov/YouandYourFamily/IllnessandDisease/Measles/Measles2019 (last visited Sept. 16, 
2020); Jonathan Lambert, Measles Cases Mount in Pacific Northwest Outbreak, NPR (Feb. 8, 
2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2019/02/08/692665531/measles-cases-mount-in-pacific-northwest-outbreak. 
 12 See, e.g., Robert McDonald et al., Measles Outbreaks from Imported Cases in Orthodox 
Jewish Communities—New York and New Jersey, 2018–2019, 68 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 444, 444 (2019). 
 13 Varun K. Phadke, Robert A. Bednarczyk, Daniel A. Salmon & Saad B. Omer, 
Association Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable Diseases in the United States: A Review 
of Measles and Pertussis, 315 JAMA 1149, 1150 (2016). 
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In some states, vaccines might be inaccessible (or hard to access) to parts 
of the population; children who live outside metropolitan areas or are on 
Medicaid are less likely to be fully vaccinated, and these rates vary across 
states.14  As a result, some states have lower coverage for some vaccines because 
of their rate of children in poverty or living in rural areas; lower coverage for 
lack of access can also create pockets of vulnerable, susceptible children.15 
Children are not the only ones with access problems: unvaccinated 
adults, and especially seniors, may also lack access, though problems in adult 
access also include lack of opportunities or attention.16 
These different problems require different solutions and Congress can 
help with all of them.  The first thing Congress can do is improve our 
understanding of vaccine hesitancy and coordinate national efforts to combat 
anti-vaccine misinformation.  Some very positive proposals in that direction 
were included in a bipartisan Senate bill in 2019, S. 1619, The Vaccine 
Awareness Campaign to Champion Immunization Nationally and Enhance 
Safety Act of 2019 (“VACCINE Act”).17  The VACCINE Act would provide for 
grants distributed from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) to examine vaccine hesitancy and conduct a national campaign to 
increase awareness about vaccines and combat misinformation—a campaign 
subject to important requirements, such as consulting with experts, making 
decisions grounded in evidence, and coordinating with other efforts.18 
In addition to providing for such infrastructure, Congress should 
provide more targeted grants.  Take the Somali community in Minnesota and 
the Ukrainian and Russian-speaking communities in Washington, for 
example.  Both saw measles outbreaks (primarily in unvaccinated children) 
in recent years, which is an example of where the primary need for confidence 
building is in these communities.19  The VACCINE Act would also specifically 
empower the CDC to award grants to address the need of specific 
communities and solve access problems.20 
 
 14 Holly A. Hill et al., Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 19–35 Months—United 
States, 2017, 67 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1123, 1123–24, 1127 (2018).  For an 
example of problems in access, see  Suzanne Potter, NV Children Uninsured Rate Worsens—
First Time in Almost a Decade, PUB. NEWS SERV. (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.publicnewsservice.org/2018-11-29/childrens-issues/nv-children-uninsured-
rate-worsens-first-time-in-almost-a-decade/a64755-1. 
 15 Hill et al., supra note 14, at 1127.  
 16 See Albert T. Bach et al., Addressing Common Barriers in Adult Immunizations: A Review 
of Interventions, 18 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 1167, 1181 (2019). 
 17 Vaccine Awareness Campaign to Champion Immunization Nationally and Enhance 
Safety Act of 2019, S. 1619, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 18 Id.  
 19 See Hall et al., supra note 10, at 716 (discussing the outbreak in the Somali 
community in Minnesota); US Health Officials Seek to Stem Measles Outbreaks Traced to Israel, 
Ukraine, MEDICAL XPRESS (Apr. 16, 2019), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2019-04-
health-stem-measles-outbreaks-israel.html. 
 20 See S. 1619. 
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In a recent post in the Health Affairs Blog, two experts with decades of 
public health experience explained that to overcome access problems, 
reforms are needed to insurance, such as “expanding Medicaid coverage, 
continuing to guarantee no-cost preventive services, and addressing cost 
barriers that have long plagued Medicare beneficiaries,” and specifically for 
Medicare, to “ensure all vaccines are provided without cost sharing.”21  
Further, the same post pointed out that fully funding the immunization 
program would, in reality, save money by reducing disease costs.22 
More generally, Congress can also allocate grants to allow states to 
experiment with different approaches to improve their vaccine rates, 
providing there is some evidence that the approach may work by using a 
competitive allocation process.  This would give states flexibility to experiment 
with different policy options—from immunization registries with automatic 
reminders to immunization drives, school clinics, broader educational efforts, 
or stronger implementation of school vaccination mandates (or funding of 
improved mandates that require legislation). 
Congress must also help by directing institutions under its control, like 
the Government Accountability Office, to examine issues limiting vaccine 
access and by directly funding more research into the causes of and solutions 
to vaccine hesitancy. 
Finally, Congress should reduce disease rates by requiring vaccines for 
certain travelers.  Congress already dabbles in this sort of legislation by 
requiring immigrants to meet vaccination requirements.23  While we think 
that the level of activity in our airports is likely too high to justify global vaccine 
requirements on entry and exit, Congress should add vaccination 
requirements to the passport process so that Americans seeking to travel have 
to meet certain requirements.24 
 
 21 J. Nadine Gracia & Amy Pisani, Vaccine Infrastructure and Education Is The Best 




 22 Id. 
 23 Vaccination Requirements, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/tools/designated-civil-surgeons/vaccination-requirements (last 
updated Jan. 10, 2020). 
 24 To get a passport for international travel, applicants are already required to submit 
documentation and provide photos and information.  Adding a requirement that 
applicants attach a medical record of immunization, or alternatively obtain a medical 
provider signature on a pre-prepared form, would allow for federal vaccine oversight.  Such 
a requirement would need to allow for medically approved exemptions.  The advantage of 
such a requirement is that it will provide an incentive to vaccinate at a point of vulnerability: 
many United States outbreaks of measles, for example, start with travelers.  See Measles 
(Rubeola): Plan for Travel, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/measles/plan-for-travel.html (last updated June 18, 2019).  It could 
help prevent and reduce outbreaks directly, by protecting people who go to areas where 
disease is endemic, and it is an area where the federal government has clear authority.  On 
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II.     WHAT ABOUT MANDATES?  
Strong school immunization mandates have important benefits and 
protect both children and the community; in our view, states should adopt 
them.  Vaccines have large benefits and small risks.25  They are among the 
major modern medical advances in the twentieth century.26  States have used 
school immunization mandates since the nineteenth century to increase 
immunization rates.27  These mandates have been described as the “gold 
standard for preventing the spread of contagious diseases,”28 and stronger 
mandates lead to fewer outbreaks.29  It is unsurprising that when the United 
 
the other hand, it will add a burden to people who travel, and is a limit on freedom of 
movement.  This proposal could benefit from further and separate development, but we 
think it is worth putting on the table. 
 25 See, e.g., Cynthia G. Whitney, Fangjun Zhou, James Singleton & Anne Schuchat, 
Benefits from Immunization During the Vaccines for Children Program Era—United States, 1994–
2013, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 352, 354 (2014), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6316.pdf (reporting that vaccines prevent 
numerous deaths and harms); Margaret A. Maglione et al., Safety of Vaccines Used for Routine 
Immunization of US Children: A Systematic Review, 134 PEDIATRICS 325, 325 (2014) (finding 
that vaccines have risks, but those are rare and outweighed by their benefits); Vaccines Are 
Safe, THE NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCI., ENGINEERING, & MED., 
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/BasedOnScience/vaccines-are-safe/ (last visited Sept. 
16, 2020) (noting that vaccines “have many health benefits and few side effects”). 
 26 See Michael Worboys, Vaccines: Conquering Untreatable Diseases, BMJ (Jan. 4, 2007), 
https://www.bmj.com/content/334/suppl_1/s19.  
 27 See Dorit Rubinstein Reiss & Lois A. Weithorn, Responding to the Childhood 
Vaccination Crisis: Legal Frameworks and Tools in the Context of Parental Vaccine Refusal, 63 
BUFFALO L. REV. 881, 892 (2015). 
 28 Brown v. Smith, 235 Cal. Rptr. 3d 218, 226 (Ct. App. 2018). 
 29 See, e.g., Nina R. Blank, Arthur L. Caplan & Catherine Constable, Exempting 
Schoolchildren from Immunizations: States with Few Barriers Had Highest Rates of Nonmedical 
Exemptions, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1282, 1289 (2013) (confirming the inverse relationship 
“between non-medical exemption rates and the complexity of exemption application 
procedures and show[ing] higher exemption rates in states permitting exemptions for 
philosophical, rather than solely religious, reasons”); Jennifer S. Rota et al., Processes for 
Obtaining Nonmedical Exemptions to State Immunization Laws, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 645, 645 
(2001) (finding that less complex nonmedical exemption application processes increase 
the number of parents claiming exemptions for children); Stephanie Stadlin, Robert A. 
Bednarczyk & Saad B. Omer, Medical Exemptions to School Immunization Requirements in the 
United States—Association of State Policies with Medical Exemption Rates (2004–2011), 206 J. 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 989, 989 (2012) (finding that states with easier medical exemption 
methods had an increased number of exemptions); W. David Bradford & Anne Mandich, 
Some State Vaccination Laws Contribute to Greater Exemption Rates and Disease Outbreaks in the 
United States, 34 HEALTH AFF. 1383, 1389 (2015) (“[W]e also found a link between our index 
of exemption law effectiveness and the incidence of preventable diseases. . . .  Vaccine 
exemption policy is thus an important part of a comprehensive plan for reducing 
preventable diseases.”); Jana Shaw et al., Immunization Mandates, Vaccination Coverage, and 
Exemption Rates in the United States, OPEN FORUM INFECT. DISEASES, May 31, 2018, at 1, 1 
(“We found higher vaccination coverage and lower nonmedical exemption rates for MMR 
and DTaP vaccines in states adopting Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
guidelines for school entry.”); Sindiso Nyathi et al., The 2016 California Policy to Eliminate 
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States faces outbreaks of preventable diseases, well-meaning federal legislators 
propose bills for a federal immunization mandate.30  
Multiple levels of government take responsibility for public health.31  But 
school vaccine mandates have traditionally been part of the states’ police 
powers.32  Based on constitutional and policy considerations, we think it 
should stay that way.  The federal government is a government of limited, 
enumerated powers.  The Constitution does not explicitly give the federal 
government direct power to regulate infectious diseases or public health, but 
Congress regulates public health using other constitutional powers. 
First, Congress has used its authority under the Commerce Clause to 
legislate public health matters, most notably by enacting the Public Health 
Services Act of 1944.33  Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is not 
unlimited, and the Supreme Court has been especially wary of this power 
when Congress tries to regulate activity that is not primarily economic.34  
School immunization mandates are not “quintessentially economic.”35  
Rather, they are more similar to the activity that Congress tried to regulate in 
United States v. Lopez, the first Supreme Court case in decades that limited 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power.36  In Lopez, the Court invalidated the 
Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbade possessing firearms in a 
school zone because gun possession was not an activity that fell within the 
scope of the Commerce Clause.37  The Court acknowledged that Congress 
could regulate economic activity that “substantially affects interstate 
commerce,” 38 but concluded that gun possession was not such an activity.39 
Similarly, school immunization mandates, whose focus is on intrastate 
schools, likely have no “substantial” effect on interstate commerce.  Arguably, 
school mandates could have some effect if parents choose where to live based 
on whether such a mandate exists and how strong it is, but such remote 
Nonmedical Vaccine Exemptions and Changes in Vaccine Coverage: An Empirical Policy Analysis, 
PLOS MED., July 12, 2019, at 1, 2 (“Our findings suggest that government policies removing 
nonmedical exemptions can be effective at increasing vaccination coverage.”). 
30 E.g., Vaccinate All Children Act of 2019, H.R. 2527, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 31 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 96–170 (2003). 
32 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & LINDSAY F. WILEY, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, 
RESTRAINT 73–79 (3d ed. 2016). 
 33 Public Health Services Act, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. Ch. 6A); Rebecca Bucchieri, Religious Freedom Versus Public Health: The Necessity of 
Compulsory Vaccination for Schoolchildren, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 265, 288 (2016); see also Jorge 
E. Galva, Christopher Atchison & Samuel Levey, Public Health Strategy and the Police Powers of
the State, 120 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 20, 23–24 (2005) (discussing federal Commerce Clause
powers to regulate public health).
34 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 23–24 (2005). 
35 Id. at 25. 
36 514 U.S. 549 (1995).   
37 Id. at 551, 561. 
38 Id. at 559; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000). 
39 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
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impacts were rejected both in Lopez40 and in another case limiting the scope 
of the Commerce Clause, United States v. Morrison.41  Consequently, a federal 
school immunization mandate likely regulates activity beyond the Commerce 
Clause power.42 
The legislators behind the federal bills appear well aware of the limits of 
using the Commerce Clause and instead have proposed exercising Congress’s 
second major power to regulate public health: conditional funding.  Section 
2(a) of H.R. 2527, the Vaccinate All Children Act, conditions funding under 
section 317 of the Public Health Services Act,43 which allows the federal 
government to give states grants to finance “preventive health service 
programs” on a mandate.44  Section 317 is not the only source of public health 
program funding available to states,45 but it is a major source of funding for 
such programs, as summarized in Figure 1 below. 
40 Id. at 563–64. 
 41 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612–17; Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 
27 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 1, 31 (2003).  For a discussion of the equal rights aspect of Morrison, 
see Kermit Roosevelt III, Bait and Switch: Why United States v. Morrison is Wrong about Section 
Five, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 626–28 (2015).  
42 In her article, Bucchieri argues the Commerce Clause is broad enough to cover 
school mandates.  Bucchieri, supra note 33, at 287–91.  Bucchieri does not, however, 
grapple with the challenge Lopez and Morrison pose and does not actually answer the points 
above.  See id. 
 43 See Vaccinate All Children Act of 2019, H.R. 2527, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019); 42 
U.S.C. § 247b. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 247b(a). 
 45 VANESSA FORSBERG & CAROLINE FICHTENBERG, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, THE 
PREVENTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH FUND: A CRITICAL INVESTMENT IN OUR NATION’S 
PHYSICAL AND FISCAL HEALTH 20–22 (2012), 
https://www.apha.org/~/media/files/pdf/factsheets/apha_prevfundbrief_june2012.ashx
. 
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FIGURE 1: 317 FUNDING AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROGRAMS46 
Congress traditionally has broad discretion to attach conditions to funds 
it provides the states, but that discretion is not unlimited.  Most relevant, the 
conditions cannot be unduly coercive.  Under the anticommandeering 
principle, Congress cannot “commandeer” a state’s legislative process and 
require a state to enact a federal regulatory program.47  Commandeering 
includes both direct requirements and coercive conditions attached to a 
state’s receipt of federal funds that effectively force the state to accept the 
conditions.48  The most recent case to consider these principles was National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, in which the Supreme Court held 
the conditions attached to states’ receipt of Medicaid funding under the 
Affordable Care Act were unconstitutionally coercive.49  The Court addressed 
whether conditioning existing Medicaid funding on a state’s adoption of 
Medicaid expansion was coercive.50  The Court was not entirely clear on what 
precisely made these conditions coercive.51  The Court did note, however, that 
the conditions for effectively expanding Medicaid conditioned states’ funding 
on their adoption of a “new program” rather than attaching conditions to the 
existing Medicaid program.52  It also emphasized that because Medicaid 
spending is such a high percentage of states’ budgets, states had no real 
46  Prepared for, and provided to the authors via the non-profit, the 317 Coalition.  
47 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–62 (1992).  
48 Id. at 161, 167; see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).  
49 567 U.S. 519, 581–82 (2012). 
50 Id. at 575. 
51 See Sara Rosenbaum & Timothy M. Westmoreland, The Supreme Court’s Surprising 
Decision on the Medicaid Expansion: How Will the Federal Government and States Proceed?, 31 
HEALTH AFFS. 1663, 1667–70 (2012); David Orentlicher, NFIB v. Sebelius: Proportionality in 
the Exercise of Congressional Power, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 463, 467–71 (2013). 
52 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 585. 
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choice about whether to adopt the expansion because they depended heavily 
on those funds.53 
Because the scope of Sebelius is unclear, there is some risk the proposed 
condition in the Vaccinate all Children Act would be struck down.  School 
immunization mandates are different in kind from existing programs funded 
via section 317, which include public health infrastructure and immunization 
programs.54  They are not directly part of these programs, though they could 
be seen as related to the general goal of disease prevention that such 
programs promote.  This matters, because Sebelius suggested that the 
closeness of the link between the condition and the goal of the funding is part 
of the assessment of whether the funding condition is constitutional.55  One 
could argue that if conditioning part of federal highway funds on passing a 
twenty-one-year-old minimum drinking age law was considered by the court 
sufficiently linked, as was the case in South Dakota v. Dole, conditioning disease 
prevention money on a school mandate—a mandate that can reduce 
outbreaks—is also sufficiently linked to be constitutional.56  One could also 
argue, however, that school mandates are qualitatively different from other 
things that section 317 funds are used for, such as purchasing vaccines for 
adults, funding infrastructure, and conducting specific immunization 
programs.57  In Sebelius, the majority found the change in Medicaid provided 
by the expansion—although also related to insurance coverage—was a 
change in kind, not in degree, and there is an argument that this too is a 
change in kind and not in degree.58  This argument, in our view, could very 
well render the condition unconstitutional. 
While section 317 is not the sole source of funding for outbreak 
prevention and immunization programs, it is an important one, but to what 
degree is actually unknown.  Erica DeWald, who works with the nonprofit 
organization Vaccinate Your Family on immunization issues, including 
funding immunization programs, explained: 
State financing of vaccines is murky at best.  Very few states still allocate 
funds from their state budget, so they are heavily reliant on [section] 317 
and other federal funds.  How money is then distributed for immunization 
programs is unclear.  You would have to call about five people in each state 
to begin to piece together how vaccines are funded.  That said, while the 
 
 53 Id. at 582; see also Orentlicher, supra note 51, at 467.  
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 56 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.  
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exact funding impact would differ from state to state, removal of 
[section] 317 funding would be devastating in each and every state.59 
This is not the magnitude in question in Sebelius.  In Sebelius, the 
Supreme Court found that  
Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average State’s total 
budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs. . . .  The 
threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget, in contrast, 
is economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.60 
However, Sebelius did not provide clear guidance on how to separate coercion 
from persuasion, and there is at least an argument that undermining a state’s 
ability to respond to outbreak in an era of increased outbreaks is coercive.  
Outbreaks can easily cost millions, and that money would have to come from 
somewhere.61  
There is no certainty that a court would find conditioning the passage of 
a mandate on section 317 funding unconstitutional.  But there is at least a 
considerable chance that a court would find the condition unconstitutional 
under the anti-coercion doctrine as set out in Sebelius, given the importance 
of existing section 317 funding, states’ long-term reliance on the program, 
and the difference between a school immunization mandate and existing 
section 317 programs. 
Beyond the constitutional concerns, there are several policy reasons to 
prefer a state-by-state approach to school immunization mandates.  First, not 
all states could meet the conditions proposed in these bills; in some states, 
their political environment does not favor federal mandates,62 potentially not 
even if the result is the loss of section 317 funding. Second, and relatedly, 
antivaccination groups are highly mobilized and often aggressive in their 
opposition;63 in some states, their arguments may align with the view of a 
majority of citizens (for example, in a state where parental rights are highly 
emphasized, or where there is a strong opposition to most state 
interventions).  If a state cannot pass a mandate, it could lose funding that 
supports existing immunization programs and public health infrastructure, 
thus reducing rather than increasing vaccine rates and harming other 
important disease prevention efforts.  A potential counter to this argument is 
that a mandate conditioned on funding changes the balance for a state and 
can make previously politically unfeasible changes feasible, but our 
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experience with changing vaccine policies is that the level of resistance from 
the anti-vaccine minority will be high, and it takes substantial political will to 
overcome it—and in a state with strong opposition, it will be very hard to do.64 
Third, there is not actually a consensus on the most appropriate policy 
to increase vaccine rates.  Some scholars and several professional medical 
associations recommend complete removal of nonmedical exemptions,65 
while other scholars raise concerns about the backlash this could create.66  
Some scholars suggest keeping religious exemptions while making it 
burdensome for parents to opt out of vaccine requirements,67 and others offer 
additional alternatives to complete removal of exemptions.68  The lack of 
scholarly and political consensus will likely be reflected in the amendments to 
a school immunization mandate law as the bill advances through Congress, 
and the result may be unacceptable to a significant portion of the country.  
For example, if Congress, motivated by strong support of religious freedom, 
adds a religious exemption, states who have removed all nonmedical 
exemptions would likely be unhappy.  Conversely, states with a majority that 
strongly values religion may be unhappy with a mandate that does not allow 
such a religious exemption.  Other loopholes could weaken the end result, 
too.69 
Finally, states vary in the challenges that may lead to pockets of under-
immunized residents.  In some states, where the main issue is refusal, a 
mandate can help.  But if the main issue is lack of access to vaccines, as 
described above, a mandate will not solve the problem and can be unfair to 
those facing real barriers to access.70 
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CONCLUSION  
For these reasons, a federal mandate is a problematic policy option.  As 
difficult as state-by-state legislative efforts are, they allow better tailoring of 
policy to a specific state’s needs, avoid removing needed funding, and allow 
experimentation (and comparison) among states.71  In other words, the most 
valuable contribution Congress can provide to raising vaccines rates is not the 
heavy tool of state-level mandates, such as mandates through (aggressive) 
funding incentives, but rather to support efforts to raise immunization rates 




 71 But see Bucchieri, supra note 33, at 282–87. 
